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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

of their qualifications. For this reason there is much agitation for an amendment
of our Act to provide for such period of probation. Whether or not such
amendment can be made, in the light of the "vested rights" which have or have
not already accrued, depending upon what attitude our courts should adopt, is a
matter of great concern. It was the opinion of J. McLean in Gere v. School
Directors, (supra) that the act may be amended or repealed by subsequent legislatures.
The form of contract prescribed in Sec. 2, of our Act embraces an undertaking to teach, although there are some persons whom the act includes who are
not employed for teaching, such as school secretaries or dental hygienists. The
Act states that the contract of all -professional employes" should only be drawn
in this prescribed form, but such would be impossible as to all these employees.
However, the Act should be interpreted most reasonably and such changes as are
necessary in the prescribed form should be made by the school board when
contracting with employees who do not teach.
It should be noted that although it is provided in the Act that a substantial decrease in the number of students due to natural causes is a sufficient cause
for suspension of a contract, no new appointment can be made while there are
suspended employees available. There is nothing in the Act which prevents a
school board from appointing a large number of unnecessary 'employees and
later suspending them with the object in view of reserving control of appointing
teachers many years after, the term of office of the school directors has expired.
More particularly, their successors inoffice would be bound by the Act to reappoint the suspended members before they could choose their own teachers. However, it would seem that our courts should not consider one a "professional employee" whose services were unnecessary at the time of his employment. If an
appointment is not made in good faith by a school board, their act should be
considered as void.
VINCENT QUINN.

THE JOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS ACT.
In the October, 1937 issue of the Dickinson Law Review a note, appearing
in reference to the passage of an act in Pennsylvania providing for the joinder
of plaintiffs, made the following comment:
"It is impossible, to foresee all the problems of interpretation involved, but in providing for the joinder of plaintiffs in circum-
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stances presenting 'any common question of law or fact' a wide latitude appears to have been granted.''1
The purpose of this note is to venture to predict the interpretations that the
courts of Pennsylvania will put upon their new act. These comments will be based
upon the successive adoption of this remedial legislation from the English Practice Act2 by New Jersey, New York and Illinois and the interpretations of the
courts in these jurisdictions. Particular emphasis will be given to the experience
of New Jersey for that state enacted this means of avoiding a multiplicity of suits
more than a quarter of a century ago,3 and secondly, the phraseology corresponds
favorably with the Pennsylvania statute.
Our problem has been simplified by this striking similarity in the enactments
of the above-mentioned states as a result of their initial source, the following
English Practice Act provision:
"All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or
in the alternative where if such persons brought separate actions any
common question of law or fact would arise; provided that, if upon
the application of any defendant it shall appear that such joinder may
embarrass or delay the trial of the action, the Court or a judge may
order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient.
And judgment may be given for such one or more of the plaintiffs as
may be found to be entitled to relief, for such relief as he or they
may be entitled to, without any amendment. But the defendant
though unsuccessful, shall be entitled to his costs occasioned by so
joining any person who shall be found not entitled to relief unless
the Court or a judge in disposing of the costs should otherwise
direct."4
Pennsylvania act of the General Assembly, No. 404, provides:
Sec. 1: "That all parties who have a right of action, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of, or arising from,
the same transaction or series of transactions, and whose actions
would give rise to any common question of law or fact, may join,
as plaintiffs, in one civil action."
142 Dickinson Law Review, 50.
English Practice Act, Order 16, r. I.

2

3N. J. Pamphlet Laws 1912, p. 378, sec. 4.
4English Practice Act, Order 16, r. 1.
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Sec. 2: "If, in any such action, it shall appear that the joinder of the
plaintiffs will complicate, prejudice or delay the trial of such action, the court, on petition or on its own motion, may order separate
trials, or make such other order as it deems expedient and proper."
Sec. 3: "In every such action, separate verdicts shall be rendered and
judgments entered as to each plaintiff." 5
The New Jersey Practice Act of 1912 phrased the New Jersey enactment very
concisely thus:
Sec. 4: "Subject to the rules, all persons claiming an interest in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the judgment demanded, either
jointly, severally or in the alternative, may join as plaintiffs, except
as otherwise herein provided. And persons interested in separate
causes of action may join if the causes of action have a common
question of law or fact and arose out of the same transaction or
6
series of transactions."
Of the enactments of the four states under consideration, the New York Civil
Practice Act of 1915 is the least useful in scope for our purpose:
Sec. 20: "The joinder of all parties plaintiff and defendant claiming
an interest in the subject of the action, whether jointly, severally
or in the alternative, shall be permitted subject to an order for a
separate trial as to any party and to suitable penalties for misjoinder."'
The Illinois Civil Practice Act of 1933 dealt with joinder of plaintiffs thus:
Sec. 23: "(Joinder of Plaintiffs) Subject to rules, all persons may
join in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any right to relief in respect
of or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is
alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative,
where if such persons had brought separate actions any common
question of law or fact would arise: Provided, that if upon the application of any party it shall appear that such joinder may embarass
or delay the trial of the action, the court may order separate trials
or make such order as may be expedient, and judgment may be given
for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found to be entitled
to relief, for the relief for which he or they may be entitled.
5Pa. P. L. 1937. No. 404. June 25, 1937.
6N. J. P. L. 1912. p. 378, sec. 4.
7N. Y. Civil Practice Act of 1915, sec. 20.
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"If anyone who is a necessary plaintiff declines to join, he may
be made a defendant, the reason therefore being stated in the complaint." 8
The comparatively short lapse of time since this enactment makes it futile to
consider its judicial construction in Illinois.
We stated above that the joindtr of plaintiffs enactment was in the nature
of remedial legislation and would avoid a multiplicity of suits. What are actions
or causes of action which have a common question of law or fact? In the determination of this question Doran v. City of Asbury Park' reached New Jersey's
highest court, the Court of Errors and Appeals. The plaintiffs in, that case joined
in one action to recover damages resulting from water being backed up on their
premises and into their cellars through the erection of a detritus tank, flume and
straightway when the defendants were laying out a new road. The jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiffs and damages were separately, assessed. On the appeal
the court stated:
"The plaintiffs were entitled to join in the action, under section 4 of
the new practice act (P. L. 1912, p. 377), there being a common
question of law and fact arising out of the same transaction."
The word "transaction" is not confined to actions ex contractu but covers
actions 'ex delicto as well. Twelve separate suits involving twelve different plaintiffs were brought against the Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. growing out of the same
Thus the trial judge in
fire and explosion, "The Black Tom Explosion."

MetropolitanCasualty InsuranceCo. of New York v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., ordered
these twelve cases to be consolidated for the purpose of trial and tried before thL
same jury, against the objection of the defendant. Ten of the suits involved
broken windows, the eleventh was for the destruction of a schooner at anchor
near the site of the 'explosion, and the twelfth by the schooner's steward to recover for injuries received and personal property destroyed by the fire and explosion. The defendant cited a long list of cases at common law but the plaintiffs
advanced the statutory provision. The defendant argued in connection with
the interpretation of the statute that the words "transaction or series of transactions"
do not include torts, but refer to contracts, business and the like. The court carefully marshalled authority in support of the holding that "transaction" must be
defined to cover actions ex delicto as well as ex contractu:
"It is synonymous with 'act', 'action', 'affair', 'business', and the
like. Standard Dictionary. It is a term broader than contract. Contract is a transaction but transaction is not necessarily a contract.
Laws of 1933,
8Illinois

p. 784, sec. 23.

991 N. J. Law 651, 104 At.

130.
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Zenia Branch Bank v. Lee, 7 Abb. Prac. (NY) 372, 389; Roberts v.
Donovan, 70 Cal. 113, 9 Pac. 180; 11 Pac. 599.
"The word 'transaction' is not limited or confined to actions
arising out of contracts. Pelton v. Powell, 96 Wis. 473, 71 N. W.
887. That it includes actions of tort cannot be reasonably doubted.
Deagan v. Weeks, 67 App. Div. 410, 73 N.Y. Supp. 641.
"In a general sense, a transaction is where both causes of action
proceed from the same wrong. Lamming v. Galushka, 135 N. Y.
239-244, 31 N. E. 1024. See Scarborough v. Smith, 18 Kan. 399,
406."10
In Messiana v. Terhune" Parker, J.,treats the joinder of plaintiffs as a frequent occurrence. There the plaintiff Di Carolis was an employee of the Plaintiff
Messiana, who was a tenant of the premises adjoining the land of the appellant,
Terhune, and both plaintiffs sustained injury because of the caving of the land, on
their side of the property line, due to excavation for a new building on land of
Terhune. Thus the two parties joined as plaintiffs in their respective individual
rights as provided in the New Jersey Practice Act of 1912.12
In Burgess v. Noteboon, Slawska v. Noteboon,13 Burgess and Slawska who
had separate claims in trespass de bonis asportatis against the same defendant joined in one action under section 4 of the Practice Act of'1912. Each had a verdict
and judgment which the Court of Errors and Appeals later affirmed.
No difficulty was experienced in interpreting what the legislature desired
to convey by parties who have a right of action "in the alternative." For example
in Reinfeld v. Laden, 14 an action was instituted by Joseph Reinfeld, or in the
alternative, S. L. Distributing Company, a corporation, against the defendant. The
court recognized the basis for such a procedure from the following facts:
"The action is to recover $5,000 paid as deposit by the plaintiff, or one of
them, on account of the purchase price of 1,000 cases of Blue Grass whisky. The
cause is laid in the alternative under the Practice Act (P. L. 1912, p. 378)par. 4."
A cursory inspection of these provisions might give rise to the assumption
that these apply to mandamus proceedings but there is a strong dictum to the
contrary in Stretch v. State Board of Medical Examiners. Stretch and three others
had applied for a writ of mandamus against the New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners to compel the Board to grant the relators licenses to practice osteopathy. Justice Parker stated:
1094 N. J. Law 236, 109 At.

743.

11106 N. J. Law 119; 148 Atd. 758.
12N. J. P. L. 1912, p. 378, sec. 4.
13100 N. J. Law 116, 124 Atd. 762.
1498 N. J. Law 709; 121 Atd. 445.
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"It is proper to say that we doubt the propriety of embracing these
four relatorA in one rule or one writ. Their rights are separate and
distinct, and depend upon different states of facts similar only in their
nature. The Practice Act of 1912 does not apply to mandamus proceedings, and if it did apply, section 4, the only pertinent provision,
5
does not cover the case."'1
Under the pre-existing law a single controversy on this question, Commonwealth
ex rel. Henry Menges & Camilla Menges v. Huttel'6 reached the Pennsylvania
higher court. It arose in the form of a suit by a tenant joined by another claiming
part of the goods distrained, to compel a constable, charged with the execution
of a landlord's warrant, to have an appraisement made of goods elected to be
retained by the tenant under the three hundred dollar exemption law. Rice, J.,
said, inter alia:
"But aside from this, the general rule is, that two or more persons
having separate interests seeking redress by mandamus cannot join
in one and the same writ, but should have separate writs according
to their several interests: 14 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 219. Where
the distinct rights of two or more persons are improperly joined, the
writ is liable to be either superseded or quashed: Tapping on Mandamus, 324 ..... .Even if she had a standing to demand an appraisement and setting apart to her of the goods claimed by her,
she asserts a separate and distinct right. It may be that she has no
such right, but it is enough for us to know that she asserts it, and
according to the rule above stated should have prosecuted it in a
separate suit. As the objection was made promptly the court committed no error in sustaining it."

J

Stretch v. the State Board of Medical Examiners was followed and approved
by the court in D'Aloia v. Civil Service Commission of New Jersey.'7 Six individual holders of six positions under the city government of Newark joined in a
rpandamus proceeding to require the civil service commission to certify their
respective salaries at certain respective amounts. The court, citing the earlier case
tleclared that while, if they were suing at law for their respective salaries, the
Icircumstances might permit a joinder of these suits under section 4 of this act,
there is no warrant of law for a joinder in a mandamus proceeding."8 Parker,J.,
said, "It follows that there should be a separate writ and separate record for each
prosecutor."
J. Law 92; 95 Att. 623.
164 Pa. Super. Ct. 95, 99.
17101 N, J. Law 427; 128 Atd. 877.
i 8 AIso see 26 Cyc. 408, 409, 409 note 54.
1588 N.
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Joinder of plaintiffs no doubt will play an important role in warranties of
fitness of goods where a number of persons have causes of action arising out of the
same transaction. A typical situation of this nature arose in New Jersey in
Griffin v. James Butler Grocery Co.19 A family group of five ate dinner together.
Four of the five partook of canned peaches .and became violently ill. Of these,
two died within a short period. The two survivors joined as plaintiffs to bring one
action against the grocery chain.,
Mrs. Berni, who joined as plaintiff in her own right (Practice Act of 1912,
Sec. 4-Comp. St. Supp. Secs. 163-280) was nonsuited for no cause of action
rather than misjoinder as Justice Parker, again giving the opinion for the court,
indicates:
"There was a nonsuit as to Mrs. Berni, the other several plaintiff, on
the ground that she was not a party to the sale, and hence not entitled to the benefit of any implied warranty. She does not appeal,
and therefore we are not concerned with this share of the litigation."
The Court of Errors and Appeals unanimously affirmed for the remaining plaintiff.
Joinder of plaintiffs is a distinct advantage in actions for damages for
personal injuries resulting from motor vehicle and railroad accidents. Five nonresident plaintiffs joined in bringing suit against the Public Service and Gas Co.
and another for injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by wires negligently left by either ono or the other of the defendants. As irtthe other cases
2
above mentioned it was held: 0
"Since the causes of action have a common question of law or fact and arose
out of the same transaction, plaintiffs joined in the present suit against both defendants, as permitted by sections 4 and 6 of the Practice Act of 1912( P.L. 1912,
c. 231, p. 378, Comp St. Supp. Secs. 163-280), Met. Cas. Ins. Co. v. L.V.R.R.
Co., 94 N. J. Law 236, 109 A. 743."21
The trial judge at Somerville in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Somerset
County, in considering a motion of the defendants to non-pros. the plaintiffs for
failure to post security for costs, defendants demanding security of $100 from each
plaintiff for each defendant or a total of $1,000, held:
"The conclusion is, consequently, that if plaintiffs collectively post a bond
for $100 to each of the defendants, in the usual statutory form with sufficient
sureties resident in this state, or deposit a like sum for the benefit of each defendant, in other words the sum of $200, the requirement of the statute will be
deemed to have been met."
19108 N. J. Law 92; 156 Atl. 636.
20Waterbury et alv.Public Service Electric & Gas Co., et al, N. J. Miscellaneous Reports 362,
171 At. 779
21See note 10, supra.
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In arriving at its decision the court considered a recent decision under New
York's Joinder of Plaintiffs Act,2 2 M. Salinoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y.,
259 N. Y. 219,23 the court there saying, inter alia:
"Section 209 (New York Civil Practice Act) was adopted for the
very purpose of avoiding such unnecessary litigation and expense.
To facilitate litigants and the courts, all persons whose claims involve
any common questions of law and fact may be joined as plaintiffs in
one action. Thus there will be but one trial, and the main issue of
fact and liability, settled in the one lawsuit ..... .The very purpose sought to be accomplished by section 209 would be somewhat
frustrated if, by consolidation into one action, costs were allowed
o4, the basis of separate actions."
Actions for wrongful death will not be and were not intended to be affected
by the Joinder of Plaintiffs Act in Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania the legislature has enacted that whenever death shall be occasioned by the unlawful negligence or violence, and no suit be brought by the party injured during his or her
life, the widow of any such deceased, or if there be no widow the personal representatives, may maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus
occasioned." Amram in Pennsylvania Common Pleas Practice, page 21, annotates the following section:
"Persons entitled to recover damages for any injuries causing death
shall be the husband, widow, children or parents of the deceased and
no other relative, and the sum recovered shall go to them in the proportion they would take his or her personal estate in case of intestacy;
and without liability to creditors. The declaration shall state who are
the parties entitled in such action, the action shall be brought within
one year after death.''25

The Death Act in New Jersey provides that the personal representative may sue in
his own name for the benefit of the surviving husband or wife and next of kin 2to6
recover damages resulting from the wrongful death of the testator or intestate.
Harris in Practice and Pleadings annotates similar statements:
"The personal representative and not the beneficiaries have control
over the foregoing cause of action. If the testator appointed an executor in his will, he is the one who can sue under the Death Act. In
22

See 209 Civil Practice Act of New York.

23181 N.

E. 457.

24Act of April 15, 1851. P. L. 669, Sec. 19.
251855, P. L. 309 (Pa.)
26N. J. Comp. St. 1908, sec. 8. as amended by P. L. 1913, page 586.
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the absence of such an executor, an ordinary administrator cannot act,
the court will appoint a special administrator ad prosequendum to
prosecute this action."
The Joinder of Plaintiffs Act was mentioned in a New, Jersey case" Stagg v. McCann.2 7 There in a bill of complaint in chancery a mother of one deceased sought
to enjoin the wife of the deceased as administratrix from prosecuting an action
undler the Death Act without joining the plaintiff or complainant as party plaintiff. The Court ot Errors and Appeals held the bill in chancery "should have
been dismissed upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction in that the complainant
had a complete remedy at law." The court then cites the Joinder of Plaintiffs Act.
As a matter of fact the law court in which she had first sought relief a justice
of the Supreme Court had already denied her claim.
Misjoinder may go very far up the judicial ladder before it is detected
that one or more of the plaintiffs are improperly joined. In Rizzie v. Pohan,2 8
husband and wife signed a preliiiinary agreement of sale of real estate belonging
to the wife and acknowledged the receipt of $500 down money. This money
the husband deposited to his own account. The contract was rescinded because
of a dispute arising over the existence of an easement. The brokers, promised
a stated commission and never compensated, and the vendee, determined to join
as plaintiffs, vendee seeking to recover $500 down money. Justice Parker declared:
"The brokers, not having received their commission, and apparently
conceiving that their claim might properly be pressed in the same
suit by virtue of section 4 of the Practice Act of 1912 (P. L., p.
378) joined as plaintiffs, though on the face of things their claim
was against the husband alone. Both claims went to judgment.
When executions issued it was discovered by the plaintiffs for the
first time (although plainly appearing on the real estate records all
the time) that the title was vested in the wife, both then and when
the brokerage and contract of sale were made.
"From this point the claim of the brokers drops out of the
case, as the Vice Chancellor held that they have no standing, on a
contract by the husband, to attack the property of the wife."
In the remainder of the opinion the court reverses the lower court decree subjecting the wife's property to a judgment against the husband.
In conclusion, how broadly will the courts use their discretionary power to
interpret the joinder acts as one state follows the precedents established by an27140 At.

393; see also 134 Atl. 846.

2896 N. J. Equity 327; 125 Atd. 240; 102 N. J. Equity 239.
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other? If Broderick v. Abrams29 is any indication we may say the courts will
construe the enactments very broadly. This case is one of many which arose out
of the numerous bank failures in the early years of the economic depression. The
Bank of the United States, a banking institution organized under the laws of New
York, was found to be in such dire straits by Broderick, New York State Superintendent of Banks, that he determined that it should be liquidated. This officer
having determined that the reasonable value of the bank's assets was not sufficient to liquidate its aggregate indebtedness in full levied an assessment upon its
stockholders under the banking laws of the State of New York which impose an
individual responsibility upon the stockholders of an institution of the character
of this one to the extent of the value of their stock at par value. The object
of this suit was to recover unpaid assessments from 558 New Jersey stockholders
and thus this action was brought by Broderick joining Abrams and 557 others.
In determining whether this would be allowed the court noted it had been invested with power to "order a separate trial among the plaintiffs, or one or more
of several plaintiffs, and the defendant, or one or more of several defendants, or
between co-defendants," 80 and the power to "strike out causes of action which
'
cannot be conveniently tried with other causes of action joined in the same suit."81
The court then gave its broad approval of joinder as follows:
"These are discretionary powers, but their exercise is guided and
controlled by the manifest policy of the statute to avoid a multiplicity
of suits and to expedite the determination of legal controversies in
accordance with the dictates of substantive rights. As indicated, the
case in hand offers nothing to justify that these joined causes of action cannot be conveniently tried together without injustice to the
applying defendants; and there is therefore no basis for a departure
from the normal statutory course of procedure."' 2
Leonard R. Blumberg.
29116 N. J. Law 40, 181 AP. 716.
SONew Jersey Supreme Court Rule 108.
SlNew Jersey Supreme Court Rule 21.
82116 N. J. Law 40, 181 Atd. 716.

